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Ferrell: Torts

TORTS
I.

FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION

In M.B. Kahn Construction Co. v. South CarolinaNational
Bank,1 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that a misrepresentation is not actionable if it "induces [a partyl, to perform an
act he was legally obligated to perform. '2 Before a plaintiff can
recover for a fraudulent misrepresentation, he must establish
both the materiality of the misstatement and his reliance on its
truth.' These elements of fraud are interrelated and both are
satisfied if the misrepresentation "played a substantial part in
leading the plaintiff to adopt his particular course."'4 Thus, when
a plaintiff is not induced by a misstatement to adopt one course
of action in derogation of alternative courses, the misrepresentation is neither material nor solely relied upon.
In 1973, Harborside Corporation began developing a condominium project financed by construction loans from South Carolina National Bank (SCN). These loans were secured by SCN's
first mortgage on the project.5 M.B. Kahn Construction Coin1. - S.C. -, 271 S.E.2d 414 (1980).
2. Id. at -, 271 S.E.2d at 415.
3. O'Shields v. Southern Fountain Mobile Homes, Inc., 262 S.C. 276, 204 S.E.2d 50
(1974). In South Carolina, a plaintiff must establish nine elements to recover for fraudulent misrepresentation:
(1) a representation; (2) its falsity;, (3) its materiality; (4) either knowledge of
its falsity or a reckless disregard of its truth or falsity; (5) intent that the representation be acted upon; (6) the hearer'es ignorance of its falsity; (7) the
hearer's reliance on its truth; (8) the hearer's right to rely thereon; (9) the
hearer's consequent and proximate injury.
Id. at 281, 204 S.E.2d at 52. This survey deals with only two of these elements: materiality and reliance.
4. W. PROssER, HANDBOOK Or THz LAw OF ToRTS, 714 (4th ed. 1971). A misrepresentation is material if(a) A reasonable man would attach importance to it6 existence or nonexistence
in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question; or
(b) the maker of the representation knows or has reason to know that its recipient regards or is likely to regard the matter as important in determining his
choice of action, although a reasonable man would not so regard it.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRs § 538 (1977). See generally, James & Gray, Misrepresentation - Part II, 37 M . L. REv. 488, 497-502, 518-22 (1978).
5.

-

S.C. at , 271 S.E.2d at 414-15.
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pany (Kahn) undertook construction of the condominiums pursuant to a contract with Harborside, that provided for monthly
progress payments of ninety percent of the value of labor and
materials stored at the site. The balance of the contract price
was due upon completion of the project. If Kahn did not receive
its progress payment from Harborside within seven days following the monthly due date, the contract permitted Kahn to suspend performance after giving notification of intent to suspend
and allowing an additional seven-day grace period for payment.6
Near the completion of the project, a progress payment to
Kahn was late but was paid within the fourteen-day period.
During this time, Kahn made inquiries about the developer's
ability to make future payments and was referred to SCN, the
construction lender.7 When told that approximately $330,000 remained due on the contract, an SCN mortgage loan officer indicated to Kahn that there were sufficient funds in the developer's
loan account to meet these future obligations. 8 At the time of
the inquiry, however, only about $43,000 actually remained in
Harborside's account.9 It was not until after Kahn had completed construction in September 1974 that it learned the developer's loan account contained an amount insufficient to pay the
balance due.10 Alleging that SCN's representation of the sufficiency of funds in Harborside's loan account had induced Kahn
to complete the construction project,"" Kahn instituted an action
for fraudulent misrepresentation against the bank.12 The special

6. Id. at

.

271 S.E.2d at 415.

7. Id. at -. 271 S.E.2d at 415.
8. Record at 35-36.
9. Id. at 35-36.
10. - S.C. at , 271 S.E.2d at 415. Harborside and Kahn entered into an agreement
in which Kahn executed a waiver and release of its mechanic's lien in exchange for
$156,000 in cash and a deferred payment of $84,000 by Harborside. As security for this
obligation to pay, Kahn received a note and second mortgage on the condominium project. The agreement further provided that Kahn was to receive a specified amount on the
sale of each unit in the complex. Record at 32. By August of 1975, however, Kahn had
received only $2,000 from the sale of condominium units. - S.C. at -, 271 S.E.2d at 415.
On August 6, 1975, SCN commenced foreclosure proceedings on its first mortgage and
note. Pursuant to a foreclosure judgment, the condominium complex was sold free of
Kahn's mortgage lien. Record at 33. The proceeds from this sale were insufficient to pay
the $82,000 still due Kahn.

-

S.C. at

.,

271 S.E.2d at 415.

11. Record at 34-35.
12. In addition to its fraudulent misrepresentation claim, Kahn asserted causes of
action for interference with the contractual relationship between Kahn and Harborside,
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referee found that SCN knowingly made the false representation13 and intended that Kahn rely on the misstatement by com1
pleting construction or refraining from filing a mechanic's lien. '
Although the referee concluded that Kahn was ignorant of the
falsity of the representation and had a right to rely on SCN's
statement, 5 he dismissed the action on the theory that the misrepresentation "was not material to any decision that Kahn had
the right to make with respect to continuing work."'16 The trial
judge confirmed these findings. The South Carolina Supreme
Court, affirming the dismissal of Kahn's cause of action for
fraudulent misrepresentation, held that because Kahn was legally obligated to complete construction under its contract with
not have been induced to do so by SCN's
Harborside, it could
17
misrepresentation.

Kahn contended that although it was under contract to constiuct the condominium project, Harborside's insolvency would
have justified a work stoppage until it received assurance of
Harborside's financial ability to meet future obligations. 8 Relying upon section 287 of the Restatement of Contracts, the Supreme Court rejected this contention.
The prospective inability of a party to perform its obligation
under a contract due to insolvency discharges the other party
from its duties under the contract where it has reasonablyand
materially changed its position, and a longer time than perunjust enrichment due to Kahn's uncompensated completion of the project, breach of
contract, and negligent supervision of Harborside's loan account (Kahn claimed to be a
third party beneficiary to the loan agreement). Record at 34. These causes of action were
dismissed by the special referee and affirmed by the trial court. Kahn did not appeal. S.C. at -, 271 S.E.2d at 415.
13. Record at 35-36, 41.
14. Id. at 41-42.
15. Id. at 42-43. The special referee also found that, assuming reliance, Kahn's damages would amount to $33,166. Id. at 43-44.
16. Id. at 40. The special referee determined that
[a]lthough the representation may have been material to Kahn's decision to
take or refrain from taking some action other than stopping work, and Kahn
may have taken or refrained from taking such other action in reliance on the
representation, I find and conclude that the representation was not material to
any decision that Kahn had the right to make with respect to continuing work,
as Kahn had no option in that respect, but was required to continue work
under the construction contract.
Id. (emphasis added).
17. - S.C. at -, 271 S.E.2d at 415.
18. Brief of Appellant at 18.
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mitted under the contract has elapsed before performance by
the insolvent party.1'

Because the progress payments to Kahn were made within the
time permitted under the contract, the court concluded that
Kahn's obligation to perform was not discharged by Harborside's insolvency.20
The court was correct in concluding that Harborside's progress payment to Kahn within the fourteen-day grace period was
timely. The court's paraphrase of the Restatement position,
however, incorrectly stated that both a material change in position and the lapse of the insolvent party's time for performance
must occur before the solvent party's contractual obligations are
discharged.2 1 Having treated the Restatement position as a conjunctive rather than a disjunctive requirement, the court did not
consider whether Kahn, could have materially altered its position
had it known of Harborside's insolvency.2 2 Because, under a
proper reading of this section, a substantial change in position
would have fully discharged Kahn's obligation to complete construction, the bank's misrepresentation was material to Kahn's
decision to finish the project.

19. - S.C. at ., S.E.2d at 416. In paraphrasing § 287 of the Restatement, the court
incorrectly used the word "and" instead of "or." Although that error may not have been
the only basis for its application, the court indicated that both requirements had to be
met before insolvency excuses the solvent party's performance. See text accompanying
notes 21-22 infra.
20. - S.C. at -, 271 S.E.2d at 416.
21. Id. That section actually states:
In promises for an agreed exchange a promisor need not perform at the time
fixed for performance of his promise if performance of the exchange is made
uncertain because the other party is insolvent... unless performance of the
exchange is rendered, tendered, or made reasonably certain by security. If the
promisor reasonably and materially changes his position, or a longer time than
is permissible under the contract elapses, before performance of the exchange
is rendered, tendered or secured, the duty of the promisor is discharged.
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 287(1) (1932) (emphasis added).
22. - S.C. at -, 271 S.E.2d at 416. The court indicated that Kahn had completed
performance substantially at the time the misrepresentation was made, implying that
Kahn could not have changed its position materially and been discharged from the contract. Id. at , 271 S.E.2d at 416. Even though Kahn substantially had completed the
project, there is the possibility that it already had contracted to undertake another construction project upon the completion of the Harborside complex. Had Kahn known of
Harborside's insolvency and ceased construction of the condominium project so it could
have begun immediate preparations for the subsequent project, it would have altered its
position materially with respect to the contract with Harborside.
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More importantly, the court entirely failed to consider the
availability to Kahn of a course of conduct other than permanent discharge of its contractual obligations. Even though a con-

tract remains in force, a solvent party may have the right to suspend performance temporarily pending the receipt of adequate
assurance of the insolvent party's return performance.' Assuming, arguendo, that the court was correct in concluding that

Harborside's insolvency did not discharge Kahn's obligations
completely,2 4 under the same Restatement section relied upon
by the court, Kahn still would have been justified in suspending

performance until future payments from Harborside were "rendered, tendered, or made reasonably certain by security.' 5 Because Kahn could have pursued this course of conduct had it
known of Harborside's insolvency, SCN's misrepresentation
clearly induced Kahn to continue construction.

Moreover, Harborside's inability to provide Kahn with adequate assurance of performance would have discharged Kahn

permanently from its contractual obligations under a separate
Restatement section.26 Although insolvency alone may be insufficient to permanently relieve the solvent party from perform-

23. Cf. Rock-Ola Mfg. Co. v. Leopold, 98 F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 1938) in which the court
indicated that, although insolvency alone is insufficient to rescind a contract for sale on
credit,
[a] distinction must be drawn between rescission and a refusal to deliver exin
cept for cash. In the latter case, the contract is treated by the seller as still
force and as binding upon both buyer and seller. The right to demand cash is
an incident to the contract and arises therefrom by operation of law. ....
... If appellee was insolvent, the right of the seller to demand cash was
paramount to the buyer's right to receive the goods.
Id. at 197-98.
24. See note 27 and accompanying text infra.
OF CONTRACTS § 287(1) (1932). See note 21 supra. See Arizona
25. RESTATEME
Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. O'Malley Lumber Co., 14 Ariz. App. 486, 484 P.2d 639 (1971).
See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 276(1) (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1973).
26. According to the RESTATEmEN (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 275 (Tent. Draft No. 8,
1973),
[w]hen reasonable grounds for insecurity arise with respect to an obligor's future performance as a result of ....
(b) his apparent inability to perform without a breach by non-performance
his failure upon a reasonable demand by the obligee to give within a reasonable time such assurance of due performance as it is reasonable to require is
a repudiation.
Id. This provision is analogous to the right of a seller to demand adequate assurance
under the UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CODE. S.C. CODE ANN.§ 36-2-609 (1976).
...
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ing 2 7 if the nature of the insolvent's future obligations is the

payment of money, the insolvency of a party gives reasonable
grounds for insecurity that he will be unable to perform. 2 An
insolvent's potential inability to render future performance coupled with his failure to provide reasonable assurance that he will
perform notwithstanding his present financial condition may be
treated as a repudiation of the contract. 29 Had Kahn known of
Harborside's insolvency and failed to receive adequate assurance
of performance, it would have been relieved of its duty to complete the condominium project.
The court found that Harborside's insolvency did not discharge Kahn's legal obligation to complete the construction project. The court, however, failed to consider Kahn's right to suspend performance until adequate assurance was given and its
corresponding right to regard any inability to give assurance as a

repudiation of the contract. Because Kahn could have pursued
courses of action other than prompt continuation of the construction schedule, 0 the court should have concluded that
SCN's misrepresentation of Harborside's insolvency materially
affected Kahn's decision.
II.

ABROGATION OF PARENTAL IMMUNITY

More than fifty years ago, the South Carolina Supreme

27. E.g., Hodes v. Hoffman Int'l. Corp., 280 F. Supp. 252 (S.D.N.Y. 196S) (applying
New York law); Hanna v. Florence Iron Co., 222 N.Y. 290 (1918). Accord, Clements v.
Jackson County Oil & Gas Co., 61 Okla. 247, 161 P. 216 (1916) (insolvency alone does not
discharge the solvent party because the insolvent still may be able to perform). Contra,
Select Theatres Corp. v.Johnson, 145 F. Supp. 583 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd per curiam,
249 F.2d 655 (2d Cir. 1957) (dicta indicating that insolvency is treated as anticipatory
breach).
28. "If the obligor's insolvency constitutes the grounds for the obligee's insecurity,
he is entitled to assurance in the form of actual performance, a conditional offer of performance, or reasonable security." Rf.TsmzEwr (SscoND) or Co rRACTS § 275, Comment e (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1973). Because this insecurity arises with respect to future
performance, no previous breach by nonperformance need be shown. Id. at Comment c.
Thus, Harborside's tender of progress payments to Kahn within the time permitted
under the contract is relevant to but not conclusive in determining the effect of failure to
give assurance of continued perfotmance.
29. See note 26 supra.
30. "Kahn might have discontinued the contract and answered to Harborside, or
considered the advisability of a mechanics' lien, or attempted some type of settlement
negotiations with the developer." - S.C. at , 271 S.E.2d at 417 (Littlejohn, J.,
dissenting).
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Court declared that an unemancipated child had no right to
maintain a negligence action against his parent for personal injuries. 31 Since that time, this immunity has been held reciprocal,
barring a parent's negligence action against the child for personal injuries. 2 In more recent decisions, the immunity has been
extended to shield from liability parents sued by the child's es34
tate for wrongful deaths and persons in loco parentis.
The leg35
islature responded to this judicially created doctrine by enacting section 15-5-210 of the South Carolina Code,36 which
abrogated parent-child immunity with respect to automobile
torts.
Both the statute and the parental immunity doctrine were
challenged in Elam v. Elam,37 as violating the equal protection

clauses of the South Carolinas' and United States Constitutions. 9 Sustaining these constitutional objections,40 the South
Carolina Supreme Court invalidated section 15-5-210' 1 and abol-

31. Kelly v. Kelly, 158 S.C. 517, 155 S.E. 888 (1930).
32. Parker v. Parker, 230 S.C. 28, 94 S.E.2d 12 (1956).
33. Maxey v. Sauls, 242 S.C. 247, 130 S.E.2d 570 (1963).
34. Gunn v. Rollings, 250 S.C. 302, 157 S.E.2d 590 (1967) (stepfather-child
relationship).
35. Parental immunity was first recognized in Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So.
885 (1891). See PRossER, supra note 4, at 964-65.
36. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 15-5-210 (1976) provides: "An unemancipated child may sue
and be sued by his parents in an action for personal injuries arising out of a motor
vehicle accident. In any such action there shall be appointed a guardian ad litem as
provided by law for such child."
37. - S.C. _, 268 S.E.2d 109 (1980). In Elam, the court considered the consolidated
appeals of three unemancipated minor passengers who were injured while riding in
automobiles allegedly operated negligently by their parents.
38. S.C. CoNST. art. I, § 3.
39. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The defendant-respondent argued that the distinction drawn by section 15-5-210 was purely arbitrary because there was no rational
reason to permit unemancipated minors injured in motor vehicle accidents to maintain
suit while denying recovery for other parental acts of negligence. Brief of Respondent at
5-6.
40. For an analysis of the constitutional issues in Elam, see ConstitutionalLaw,
Annual Survey of South CarolinaLaw, 33 S.C.L. Rxv. 21, 21-25 (1981).
41. - S.C. at -, 268 S.E.2d at 110. The South Carolina Supreme Court has invalidated two other automobile tort statutes on equal protection grounds: the automobile
comparative negligence statute, S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1-300 (1976) in Marley v. Kirby,
271 S.C. 122, 245 S.E.2d 604 (1978); and the automobile guest statute, S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 15-1-290 (1976) in Ramey v. Ramey, 273 S.C. 680, 258 S.E.2d 883 (1979). The constitutional issues in Marley are examined in ConstitutionalLaw, Annual Survey of South
Carolina Law, 31 S.C.L. Rav. 21, 29 (1979). For a discussion of Ramey, see Constitutional Law, Annual Survey of South CarolinaLaw, 32 S.C.L. REv. 29, 29 (1980); Torts,
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ished the doctrine of parental immunity.42
In its examination of the inconsistencies in the parent-child
immunity doctrine, the court noted that the doctrine's prohibitive effect was limited to suits between parent and unemancipated child for tortious injuries. 48 An emancipated child, regardless of age, could maintain a negligence action against the
parent." The injustice of blanket immunity is illustrated by the
following example.
Two siblings reside under the same parental roof. One is an
unemancipated minor aged 17 years and the other an emancipated minor aged 16. The latter is a married daughter living at
home while her husband is serving an Army hitch overseas.
While both are riding as passengers in a car driven by the father, an accident occasioned by the father's negligence occurs,
resulting in injuries to both children. The parental immunity
doctrine bars an action by the45unemancipated 17 year old, but
not by the married daughter.
Moreover, an unemancipated child could sue his parent for
property or contract disputes. 46 Finding "no logical justification
for such distinctions,' 7 the court concluded that the policies
which persuaded
courts to adopt parental immunity have lost
48
vitality.
their
South Carolina's adoption of parental immunity was based
upon the preservation of family harmony, unity, and parental
discipline. 4" The theory underlying this rationale was that permitting a parent and child to maintain tort actions against each
other would seriously erode family stability.50 The court in Elam

Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 32 S.C.L. REv.205, 217 (1980).
42.

-

S.C. at ., 269 S.E.2d at 112.

43. Id. at ., 268 S.E.2d at 110.
44. Id. at _,268 S.E.2d at 110.

45. Streenz v. Streenz, 11 Ariz. App. 10, 12, 461 P.2d 186, 188 (1969) (Howard, J.,
dissenting). Arizona abolished parental immunity the following year in Streenz v.
Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 471 P.2d 282 (1970).
46. - S.C. at .,268 S.E.2d at 110. E.g., Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 471 P.2d
282 (1970); Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952). See H. CLARK, THE
LAW OF DoMEsTxC RELAIONS iN THz UNrrmD STATm, § 256 (1968); PROSSER, supra note 4,
at 865.
47. - S.C. at ., 268 S.E.2d at 110.
48. Id. at -, 268 S.E.2d at 111.

49. Parker v. Parker, 230 S.C. 28, 31, 94 S.E.2d 12, 13 (1956).
50. Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 161 N.W.2d 631 (1968). The purpose of
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acknowledged three factors militating against the continuing viability of this justification. First, the disruption of the family occurs at the time of the injury, long before any suit is brought.51
Second, because "the existence of universal automobile liability
insurance" makes the insurance company the real defendant, intrafamily suits are unlikely to be disruptive. 52 Finally, even when
the defendant family member lacks insurance coverage, tort actions cannot be regarded seriously as creating greater family
conflict than property or contract disputes.53
Moreover, the court rejected the possibility of fraud and
collusion as sufficient justification for retaining parental immunity5 4 and indicated, without elaboration, that its ruling on this
issue in Ramey v. Ramey55 was dispositive. 56 The court in
Ramey abolished South Carolina's automobile guest statute on
constitutional grounds and noted that "the wholesale elimination of all guests' causes of action for negligence does not treat
similarly situated persons equally, but instead improperly discriminates against guests on the basis of a factor which bears no
significant relation to actual collusion. ' 57 It then concluded that
the discriminatory effect of the statute outweighed any inciden-

parental immunity was
to uphold, protect and sustain the family unit as a basic, living pillar of our
society under parental discipline. Authority was vested in the father, or other
parent, as head of the house. The law sought to shield the family unit from
disruptive, internal disturbances. It is based upon the assumption that the parent will care for guard and control the infant and other members of the family
unit. That is his obligation. It was proper, therefore, for the courts to grant
him immunity from the commonplace failures bound to occur in the course of
daily life in every household ....
Henderson v. Henderson, 11 Misc. 2d 449, 454, 169 N.Y.S.2d 106, 112 (1957).
51. - S.C. at -, 268 S.E.2d at 111 (citing Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 380, 282 A.2d
351, 355 (1971)). Accord, Petersen v. City & County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 484, 462
P.2d 1007 (1970).
52. - S.C. at - 268 S.E.2d at 111. Although the court only considered the widespread existence of automobile liability insurance, the availability of other types of insurance to compensate the child for injuries greatly diminishes the possibility of disruption in other contexts as well. See, e.g., Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 88, 471 P.2d 282,
284 (1970); Anderson v. Stream, - Minn. _,295 N.W.2d 595, 600 n.7 (1980).
53. - S.C. at , 268 S.E.2d at 111. Accord, Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103
N.E.2d 743 (1952).
54.

-

S.C. at _,268 S.E.2d at 111.

55. 273 S.C. 680, 258 S.E.2d 883 (1979).
56.

-

S.C. at

-,

268 S.E.2d at 111.

57. 273 S.C. at 685, 258 S.E.2d at 885 (quoting Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal.3d 855, 877,
506 P.2d 212, 215, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388, 391 (1973)).
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tal benefit it might have had in preventing collusive suits. 58 Similarly, the prevention of collusive suits does not justify adherence to a parental immunity doctrine which denies recovery to
all minors. 59 "It would be unjust to bar arbitrarily the claims of
injured minors deserving of relief solely because some cases may
involve possible collusion between two parties." 0 As the court
concluded in Ramey, the imposition of civil law sanctions for
collusive litigation is preferable to the exclusion of an entire
class of litigants. 6' Finding the threat of family discord and collusive suits insufficient to justify parental immunity, the court in
Elam abolished this doctrine in South Carolina.6 2
Some courts, however, have found that partial abrogation of
the doctrine better protects a child's interests, while effectively
limiting disruptive litigation." In these jurisdictions, parental
immunity has been abolished with two exceptions: "(1) Where
the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of reasonable parental authority over the child; and (2) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of ordinary parental discretion with
respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and
dental services, and other care.""
This approach has been the subject of disapproval6 5 because
the terms "ordinary" and "reasonable" are subject to several interpretations: first, a parent is immune only if his conduct is not
negligent; and second, he is immune if his conduct is negligent
but not outrageous.1" This inherent difficulty in determining the

58. 273 S.C. at 685, 258 S.E.2d at 885.
59. Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 365, 339 N.E.2d 907, 915 (1975).
60. Id. Another inconsistency with the collusive suit argument not considered in
Ramey is that the possibility of collusion is no more immediate in parent-child suits than
in actions between parents and emancipated children, brothers and sisters, and husbands
and wives. Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 920, 479 P.2d 648, 651, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 291
(1971).
61. 273 S.C. at 685, 258 S.E.2d at 885.
62.

-

S.C. at _, 268 S.E.2d at 112.

63. Lemmen v. Servais, 39 Wis. 2d 75, 158 N.W.2d 341 (1968). Accord, Schneider v.
Coe, 405 A.2d 682 (Del. 1979); Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972);
Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 161 N.W.2d 631 (1968).
64. Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 8, 199 N.W.2d 169, 172-73 (1972). Accord, Silesky
v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 161 N.W.2d 631 (1968); Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122
N.W.2d 193 (1963).
65. See CLARK, supra note 46, at 258-59.
66. Anderson v. Stream, - Minn. , , 295 N.W.2d 595, 598 (1980) (overruling
Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 161 N.W.2d 631 (1968)).
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precise scope of the partial parental immunity doctrine creates
the "danger of arbitrary line-drawing"6 7 and inconsistent
results.8 8
Recognition of this danger has led some courts that have
totally abrogated parental immunity to establish guidelines for
determining whether the parent would be held liable for negligent exercise of parental authority or discretion.6° "The standard to be applied is the traditional one of reasonableness, but
viewed in light of the parental role. Thus,. . . the proper test of
a parent's conduct is this: what would an ordinarily reasonable
and prudent parent have done in similar circumstances?" 70 This
standard is not meant to shield parents from or subject them to
liability for every child-rearing mistake. Rather, it permits judicial scrutiny of the reasonableness of parental conduct on a caseby-case basis. 1
The Supreme Court of South Carolina, having abrogated
the parental immunity doctrine in Elam, should now consider
the "ordinary and reasonable parent" standard as the measure
for determining the existence of parental liability. This standard
accommodates two competing societal interests: protection of
parents in their exercise of discretion and authority in raising
children and allowance of children's meritorious claims for un-

67. Id. at _, 295 N.W.2d at 598.
68. Compare Paige v. Bing Constr. Co., 61 Mich. App. 480, 233 N.W.2d 46 (1975)
with Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Corp., 56 Wis. 2d 231, 201 N.W.2d
745 (1972) (different results in determining whether parental supervision was included in
the parental authority exception).
69. Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal.3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971); Anderson
v. Stream, - Minn. -, 295 N.W.2d 595 (1980). For a criticism of the reasonable parent
standard, see Anderson v. Stream, - Minn. at - 295 N.W.2d at 601-04 (Rogosheske, J.,
dissenting).
70. Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal.3d at 921, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293. A reasonableness standard
would not require that a parent live up to some idealized picture of a model
father or mother. A mere misjudgment in supervising one's child would not

necessarily constitute a tortious breach of duty. In determining whether the
bounds of reasonable behavior have been transgressed, all of the relevant facts

and circumstances would have to be considered.
Nolechek v. Gesuale, 46 N.Y.2d 343, 346-47, 385 N.E.2d 1268, 1277, 413 N.Y.S.2d 340,
350 (1978) (Fuchsberg, J., concurring).

71. See Comment, The "ReasonableParent" Standard: An Alternative to ParentChild Tort Immunity, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. 795, 810 (1976). See generally, Note, Intrafamilial Tort Immunity in New Jersey: Dismantling the Barrierto PersonalInjury
Litigation. 10 Rur-CAM. L.J. 661 (1979).
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reasonable parental conduct.
III. No

CAUSE OF ACTION FOR "WRONGFUL LIFE"

In Phillips v. United States,72 a child born with Down's
Syndrome7 3 commenced an action against the United States "4
for wrongful life.7 5 The claim alleged that the negligent failure of
a physician to warn the child's parents of the possibility of his
defective birth proximately caused his parents to continue the
pregnancy.70 Because the action was instituted pursuant to the
Federal Tort Claims Act,77 the district court was obligated to
8
apply the law of the state in which the negligence occurred."
Defendant moved for summary judgment, asserting that a
wrongful life allegation did not state a claim upon which relief
could be granted.7 9 The district court granted the motion, con72. 508 F. Supp. 537 (D.S.C. 1980). In a companion case, the plaintiff's parents
brought suit for wrongful birth, alleging that they would have terminated the pregnancy
had they known of the possibility of the child's birth defects. The district court denied
the defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding the wrongful birth claim a legally
cognizable cause of action. Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544 (D.S.C. 1981). For
a discussion of the distinctions between actions for wrongful life and wrongful birth, see
Trotzig, The Defective Child and the Actions for Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth, 14
FAM. L.Q. 15 (1980).
73. Down's Syndrome is a syndrome of mental retardation associated with physical
abnormalities including retarded growth, laxness of joint ligaments, and broad hands and
feet. 508 F. Supp. at 539 n.3 (citing STzu ,'s MEICAL DICTIoNARY 1382 (4th unabr.
lawyer's ed. W. Dornette 1976)).
74. The action was brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act on behalf of the
child by his father as guardian ad litem.
75. See generally, Trotzig, supra note 72.
76. By asserting a wrongful life claim,
[t]he child does not allege that the physician's negligence caused the child's
deformity. Rather, the claim is that the physician's negligence-his failure to
adequately inform the parents of the risk-has caused the birth of the deformed child. The child argues that but for the inadequate advice, it would not
have been born to experience the pain and suffering attributable to the
deformity.
Comment, "Wrongful Life": The Right Not to be Born, 54 TuwmN L. Rav., 480, 485
(1980).
77. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1976).
78. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b) (1976). Absent controlling precedent, the district court
must "attempt to predict the determination that the state Supreme Court would reach
on the question." 508 F. Supp. at 540. Cf. Quinones v. United States 492 F.2d 1269, 1273
(1974) (predicting that the state of Pennsylvania would recognize a cause of action for
negligent maintenance of employment records).
79. 508 F. Supp. at 538. Defendant also asserted that failure to provide genetic
counseling and testing did not constitute negligence with respect to the plaintiff; that
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cluding that a cause of action for wrongful life does not exist in
South Carolina, and that the South Carolina Supreme Court, if
confronted with a wrongful life claim, would decline to recognize
it for public policy reasons.80
Plaintiff's mother was a patient of the Charleston Naval Regional Medical Center throughout her pregnancy. During one
visit to the center, Mrs. Phillips completed a prenatal questionnaire in which she indicated that her sister was afflicted with
Down's Syndrome. This family history of mental retardation was
noted by the physician attending Mrs. Phillips, yet, despite this
information, she was neither counseled further nor given genetic
testing.81
The court examined wrongful life cases in the few jurisdictions that have addressed the issue.8 2 Noting that only one state
has allowed such a cause of action, 88 the court focused on the
plaintiff suffered no legally cognizable damages; and that plaintiff lacked standing to sue.
Id.
80. Id. at 544.
81. Id. at 540.
82. Only seven other jurisdictions have addressed wrongful life claims. Six have refused to recognize this cause of action. Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F.
Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Smith v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ohio 1975);
Elliot v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546 (Ala. 1978) (denial of wrongful pregnancy claim which
the court characterized as a cause of action for wrongful life); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49
N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967) (overruled in part by Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d
8 (1979)); Johnson v. Yeshiva Univ., 42 N.Y.2d 818, 364 N.E.2d 1340, 396 N.Y.S.2d 647
(1977); Becker v. Schwartz, 60 A.D.2d 587, 400 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1977), modified, 46 N.Y.2d
401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 400
N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977), modified sub nom. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d
807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 A.D.2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933
(1977); Greenberg v. Kliot, 47 A.D.2d 765, 367 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1975) (facts summarized in
Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 93, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110, 116-18 (1977) (Titone, J., dissenting)); Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., 58 Misc. 2d 432, 296 N.Y.S.2d 41 (Sup. Ct.
1968), modified, 35 A.D.2d 531, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1970), afld mem., 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283
N.E.2d 616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972); Speck v. Finegold, - Pa. Super Ct. _, 408 A.2d 496
(1979); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hoep., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
83. Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 175 Cal. Rptr. 477
(Ct. App. 1980). The district court determined that certain factual dissimilarities diminished the applicability of Curlender to the case at bar. In Curlender,defendants, a physician and two medical laboratories, were alleged to have committed preconceptionnegligent acts. At the request of plaintiff's parents, defendants completed genetic tests to
determine whether the parents were carriers of heriditary Tay-Sachs Disease. Receipt of
erroneous information that they were not carriers was determinative of the parents' decision to conceive the plaintiff. The district court indicated that this preconception negligence may well have affected the public policy issues examined in Curlender.Moreover,
the court considered the reasoning in Curlender unpersuasive; noting that Robak v.
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justifications for denying wrongful life claims. The difficulty of
ascertaining damages is readily apparent,8 ' because an award of
compensatory damages for an infant plaintiff's birth would require "a comparison between the Hobson's choice of life in an
impaired state and nonexistence."8 5 Nonetheless, the court determined that if the calculation of damages were the only impediment to the plaintiff's recovery, the cause of action would
not be denied.8
The court reached similar conclusions with respect to
whether the defendant owed a duty of care to an unborn child
and whether the doctor's breach of this duty was the proximate
cause of the child's birth. To the extent that prenatal torts have
been recognized in South Carolina when the fetus was viable at
the time of the negligent act,8 7 the court concluded that there is
no inherent barrier to a finding that the defendant owed the unborn child a duty of care.88 In terms of causation, the plaintiff's
allegation that the physician's negligence prevented a parental
decision to terminate the pregnancy, coupled with the availability of eugenic abortions,8 9 indicated that proximate cause was
not an "insurmountable barrier."9 0
Although the court was not dissuaded by these considerations, it denied plaintiff's claim. Courts have been prompted to
reject claims for wrongful life for many reasons, 91 yet, the district court perceived the single policy consideration underlying
them all, "the preciousness and sanctity of human life," to be
the determinative factor in granting defendant's motion for

United States, No. 77 C 3595 (N.D. IM.August 11, 1980), the single case decided subsequent to Curlender, also declined to recognize a wrongful life claim. 508 F. Supp. at 541.
84. See, e.g., Glietman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967); Becker v.
Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
85. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 413, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895,
900 (1978).
86. 508 F. Supp. at 542.
87. Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964) (recognizing a cause of
action for the wrongful death of a viable fetus).
88. 508 F. Supp. at 542.
89. The alternative of an eugenic abortion "would certainly appear to fall within the
ambit of the Supreme Court's decisions in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)." 508 F. Supp. 537.
90. Id.
91. E.g., Johnson v. Yeshiva Univ., 42 N.Y.2d 818, 364 N.E.2d 1340, 396 N.Y.S.2d
647 (1977) (the metaphysical, theological, or philosophical nature of the issues); Berman
v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979) (absence of recognized damages).
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summary judgment.9 2
IV.

A.

PRODUCTS LIABiITY

No Retrospective Application of Section 402A

Since the 1974 legislative enactment of strict tort liability,
section 15-73-10 of the South Carolina Code,'9 3 the South Carolina Supreme Court has several times avoided determining
whether the statute operates retroactively." The question now
has been resolved: causes of action arising before the 1974 enact-

ment cannot be based upon statutory section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
In Hatfield v. Atlas Enterprises,Inc.,9 5 plaintiff brought a
products liability action based upon negligence, breach of war-

ranty, and strict liability in tort for injuries sustained from a
blaze caused by fireworks. Defendant's demurrer to the strict liability cause of action was sustained by the trial court, which

ruled that this theory of recovery was not recognized in South
Carolina at the time plaintiff was injured.98 On appeal, plaintiff

contended that strict tort liability was part of the state's common law at the time of the injury and, alternatively, that section
97
402A should be applied retroactively.
The court relied upon its dictum in Lane v. Trenholm

92. 508 F. Supp. at 543-44.
93. S.C. CODE. ANN. § 15-73-10 (1976) provides that:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) The seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) It is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) shall apply although
(a) The seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) The user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
94. See Young v. Tide Craft, Inc., 270 S.C. 453, 242 S.E.2d 671 (1978); Marchant v.
Mitchell Distrib. Co., 270 S.C. 29, 240 S.E.2d 511 (1977). For a brief analysis of the
retroactivity issue in Young and Marchant, see Products Liability, Annual Survey of
South CarolinaLaw, 31 S.C.L. Rav. 101, 114-15 (1979).
95. 274 S.C. 247, 262 S.E.2d 900 (1980).
96. The action was brought against the manufacturers and distributors of the fireworks. Id. at 248, 262 S.E.2d at 900.
97. Id. at 248-49, 262 S.E.2d at 900-01.
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Building Co.98 that the legislature had "recognized the clear
drift of the common law in this state when it codified Restate-

ment of Torts (2) Section 402A, which imposes strict liability in
tort upon the suppliers of defective products" '

and concluded

that strict liability in tort was not part of the common law of
South Carolina.10 0 Although the court provided no further expla-

nation, its conclusion is supportable. At the time plaintiff was
injured, negligence and breach of warranty were the primary
theories of recovery available in products liability actions.10 1 Al-

though the abrogation of the privity requirement

0

2

in breach of

warranty actions arguably has made that theory virtually identi-

cal to strict tort liability,103 the latter theory was not available to
a plaintiff until the legislative enactment of section 402A.104
Addressing the issue of retrospective application of section

402A, the court stated without further exposition that "the rea-

soning in Hyder v. Jones 0 5 . . . is dispositive of this issue and
supports the trial court's decision that these provisions operate

prospectively only." 106 In Hyder, the court articulated the gen98. 267 S.C. 497, 229 S.E.2d 728 (1976).
99. Id. at 504 n.3, 229 S.E.2d at 731 n.3.
100. 274 S.C. at 248, 262 S.E.2d at 901.
101. In two diversity cases interpreting South Carolina law, the district court
reached this conclusion. Cooley v. Salopian, 383 F. Supp. 1114, 1118 (D.S.C. 1974); McHugh v. Carlton, 369 F. Supp. 1271, 1271 (D.S.C. 1974).
102. E.g., Gasque v. Eagle Machine Co., 270 S.C. 499, 243 S.E.2d 831 (1978); Springfield v. Williams Plumbing Supply Co., 249 S.C. 130, 153 S.E.2d 184 (1967); Beasley v.
Ford Motor Co., 237 S.C. 506, 117 S.E.2d 863 (1961). See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-318
(1976) (effective January 1, 1968).
103. A breach of warranty action is a form of strict liability since the plaintiff is not
required to establish failure to exercise due care. See generally, 2 L. FRUMER & M.
FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILrrY § 1614][a] (1980); 1 R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN
LAW OF PRoDuCTs LIABIrrY 2d

§

3:1 (1974); Rapson, ProductsLiability Under Parallel

Doctrines: Contrasts Between the Uniform Commercial Code and Strict Liability in
Tort, 19 RUTGERS L. REy. 692 (1965).
104. Applying South Carolina law in two diversity actions, the district court determined that strict tort liability for defective products did not exist in the state's common
law prior to 1974. Cooley v. Salopian, 383 F. Supp. 1114 (D.S.C. 1974); McHugh v. Carlton, 369 F. Supp. 1271 (D.S.C. 1974).
105. 271 S.C. 85, 245 S.E.2d 123 (1978). In Hyder the court held that S.C. CODE
ANN. § 15-5-210 (1976), which abrogates the doctrine of parental immunity with respect
to automobile accidents, would not be given retrospective effect. Prior to this enactment,
common law parental immunity prevented children from maintaining tort actions
against their parents. Because the statute clearly created a right of action unavailable at
common law, it was construed as operating prospectively only. Id. at 88, 245 S.E.2d at
125.
106. 273 S.C. at 249, 262 S.E.2d at 901.
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eral rule that a statute is presumed to have prospective effect
unless the legislature clearly intends the act to have retrospective application.1 0 7 South Carolina's strict tort statutes, including the comments to section 402A incorporated by reference,10 8
reveal no express or implied intent by the General Assembly to
apply the provisions retroactively. The general rule is inapplicable, however, when a statute is remedial or procedural.10 9 There
is one limitation on the retrospective application of a remedial
statute: if it supplies "a legal remedy where formally [sic] there
was none,"1 10 the statute may be given prospective effect only.1 1
The court, offering no analysis on this issue, relied solely upon

its conclusion that, prior to the enactment of section 402A, strict
tort liability was not judicially recognized in products liability
actions.1 2 The court's reliance on Hyder suggests that the legislative enactment of strict liability in tort provided a remedy previously unavailable in* products liability actions; 113 hence the
statute cannot operate retroactively.1
Confronted with a similar problem of the retrospective application of a statutory section 402A, 11 5 the Arkansas Supreme

107. 271 S.C. at 88-89, 245 S.E.2d at 125. Accord, Howard v. Allen, 368 F. Supp. 310
(D.S.C. 1973); Neel v. Shealy, 261 S.C. 266, 199 S.E.2d 542 (1973); Jefferson Standard
Life Ins. Co. v. King, 165 S.C. 219, 163 S.E. 653 (1932).
108. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-30 (1976).
109. 271 S.C. at 88, 245 S.E.2d at 125.
110. Id. at 88, 245 S.E.2d at 125.
111. Id. at 88, 245 S.E.2d at 125.
112. 273 S.C. at 249, 262 S.E.2d at 901.
113. It has been suggested that § 402A created no new liabilities. To the extent that
a seller of a defective product was subject to liability for negligence or breach of warranty prior to the enactment of § 402A, strict tort liability may lessen the "difficulty of
establishing a prima facie case, [but] does not impose liability in a case where the defendant was assured of nonliability under negligence and warranty principles." Torts, Annual Survey of South CarolinaLaw, 27 S.C.L. REv.554, 618 (1975). Furthermore, in its
holding that strict liability was not part of South Carolina common law in 1970, the
court made no mention of the existence of strict liability in tort in the limited area of
abnormally dangerous activities. See Wallace v. A.H. Guion & Co., 237 S.C. 349, 117
S.E.2d 359 (1960). In effect, strict liability also has been reached as a matter of common
law in cases applying the common law implied warranty of habitability. See Rogers v.
Scyphers, 251 S.C. 128, 161 S.E.2d 81 (1968).
114. Contra, Cooley v. Salopian, 383 F. Supp. 1114 (D.S.C. 1974) (applying South
Carolina law). In Cooley, Judge Hemphill noted in dictum that § 402A was remedial,
and, therefore, it applied retrospectively. Id. at 1118. The court, however, did not consider whether the statute created a new right of action.
115. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-2-318.2 (Supp. 1979). Statutory strict liability has been
adopted in only six states: Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Maine, Oregon, and South Caro-
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Court in General Motors Corp. v. Tate11 determined that the
statute would not be given retroactive effect because it created a
new theory of recovery.1 17 Strict liability in tort
confers upon a plaintiff the right to recover damages upon a
theory and under circumstances where a cause of action did
not formerly exist ....

Before the adoption of the act, appel-

lee could have only recovered by proving negligence or breach
of warranty. After the passage of the act . . . neither negligence nor breach of warranty would be an essential ingredient
of the cause of action in strict liability. Thus a new cause of
action exists and a new liability is imposed.118
The analysis provided by the Arkansas Supreme Court supports
the conclusion reached in Hatfield that the legislative enactment
of strict liability in tort can operate only prospectively.
B. Implied Warranty
In JKT Co. v. Hardwick,119 the South Carolina Supreme
Court held that a manufacturer-seller's implied warranties extend to a remote corporate vendee.1 20 The court noted South
Carolina's statutory extension of third-party beneficiary protection to natural persons, 21 but relied primarily upon the common
lina. W. KEETON, D. OWEN & J. MONTGOMERY, PRODUCTS LmmrIY AND SAFETY 204-05 n.7
(1980).
116. 257 Ark. 347, 516 S.W.2d 602 (1974).
117. Id. at 353-54, 516 S.W.2d at 606-07.
118. Id. See also Wansor v. George Hantscho Co., 243 Ga. 91, 252 S.E.2d 623 (1979)
in which the Georgia Supreme Court held that statutory strict liability would not be
applied retroactively because it created a new cause of action in tort. The scope of the
statute, however, was narrower than § 402A and provided for strict liability against a
manufacturer of defective personal property sold as new.
119. - S.C. _, 265 S.E.2d 510 (1980).
120. Id. at _, 265 S.E.2d at 512.
121. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-318 (1976). This section provides that "[a] seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who may be expected to
use, consume or be affected by the goods and whose person or property is damaged by
breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section."
Id.
The UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE provides three optional provisions for § 2-318.
South Carolina's version, however, is nonstandard, a blend of alternatives B and C. The
three alternatives are as follows:
Alternative A
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his
home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be
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law erosion of privity122 and found no reason to distinguish
between consumer and corporate plaintiffs on the issue of
12

privity.

Plaintiff JKT purchased a warehouse that was constructed
pursuant to a contract between the vendor and Easley Lumber
Company, the general contractor. When, several years after construction, the warehouse roof began to blister and leak, JKT instituted an action for negligence, willfulness, and breach of warranty against Easley, Hardwick (the roofing subcontractor for
Easley), and Celotex (the manufacturer-seller of the roofing
materials).lu The jury returned a verdict against Easley 25 and
Celotex. On appeal, Celotex contended that privity of contract
was essential to JKT's breach of warranty action because section
36-2-318 of the South Carolina Code dispensed with the need for
privity only with respect to natural persons.1 26 The supreme
court rejected this contention.1 2 Although language in the opin-

affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty.
A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
Alternative B
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the
goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not
exclude or limit the operation of this section.
Alternative C
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any person who
may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and
who is injured by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the
operation of this section with respect to injury to the person of an individual to
whom the warranty extends.
Four other states, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Virginia, have adopted
nonstandard provisions. J. WHrr & 1& SUMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 404 n.20
(1980). For a list of states adopting each alternative, see id. at 403-04.
122. See note 136 and accompanying text infra. The privity requirement also has
been eliminated in products liability actions based upon the negligence of the manufacturer. E.g., Carolina Home Builders, Inc. v. Armstrong Furnace Co., 259 S.C. 346, 191
S.E.2d 774 (1972); Salladin v. Tellis, 247 S.C. 267, 146 S.E.2d 875 (1966).
123. - S.C. at , 265 S.E.2d at 512.
124. Id. at , 265 S.E.2d at 511. Another defendant, the architect who designed the
warehouse, was granted a nonsuit. Id. at -, 265 S.E.2d at 511.
125. The supreme court reversed the verdict against Easley. Easley's only connection with the installation of the roof had been to employ a subcontractor, Hardwick, to
perform the work. Because the jury exonerated Hardwick, the verdict against Easley was
inconsistent and the lower court erred in refusing to grant Easley's motion for judgment
n.o.v. Id. at _, 265 S.E.2d at 514.
126. Id. at , 265 S.E.2d at 512. See note 122 supra.
127. - S.C. at , 265 S.E.2d at 512.
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ion suggests that the court construed section 36-2-318 to include
corporate purchasers, 2 8 the holding rests on the erosion of the
common law privity requirements.
Section 36-2-318 of the South Carolina Code, which is an
amalgam of two of the alternative forms provided by section 2318 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 129 extends warranties to
natural persons not in privity with the seller.130 Because the
plaintiff is a corporation rather than a natural person, this provision clearly does not eliminate the need for privity in the instant
case. The court determined, however, that there was "no sound
reason, in jurisprudence or logic, why the language of Code § 362-318 should be taken as the outer boundary of the abolition of
privity, or why the developing case law should be inhibited
thereby." 131
The official comments to this section indicate that
[t]his section expressly includes as beneficiaries within its provisions the family, household, and guests of the purchaser. Beyond this, the section is neutral and is not intended to enlarge
or restrict the developing case law on whether the seller's warwho resells, extend to other persons
ranties, given to the buyer
132
in the distributive chain.
Although this comment appears in the Code following South
128. "Celotex contends the term 'natural' describing the persons to whom implied

warranties extend under this section, excludes respondent, a corporation, from its scope.
This construction is untenable." - S.C. at -, 265 S.E.2d at 512 (emphasis added). Apparently, this statement need not be taken in point of statutory construction in the strict
sense; rather it expresses the court's intent to include remote corporate vendees as a
matter of extended judicial application of implied warranty protection.
129. See note 121 supra.
130. See note 122 supra.
131. - S.C. at .., 265 S.E.2d at 512.
132. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-318, Official Comment 3 (1976). The South Carolina
Reporter's Comments are directed toward Alternative A of the official version and not to
South Carolina's nonstandard provision.
The Commercial Code generally takes a neutral position on the issue of privity
leaving the matter as stated in the official comments to Section 2-318 to "the
developing case law." The one factual situation which the Commercial Code
section deals with is where a member of a family buys defective goods which
are consumed by other members of the family or guests in the home resulting
in personal injury. In such case, the warranty runs with the goods, thus eliminating the privity requirement.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-318, South Carolina Reporter's Comments (1976). For a discussion of the South Carolina Reporter's Comments, see Products Liability, Annual Survey

of South Carolina Law, 31 S.C.L. Rsv. 101, 103-05 (1979).
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Carolina's version of section 2-318, it is applicable only to alter-

native A and not to this state's nonstandard provision.

8

More-

over, jurisdictions in which courts have relied on this comment

to justify the abrogation of the privity requirement in situations
not covered by section 2-318 have a version identical to alternative A. 1 4 Although the official comment is not applicable to
South Carolina law, its inclusion nonetheless evidences a legislative intent that section 36-2-318 should not restrict common law
1 35
developments in the area of privity.
Dispensing with the requirement of privity for remote corporate vendees in JKT is consistent with prior South Carolina
decisions."' There is no valid reason for the court to "erect an
artificial line distinguishing between consumer plaintiffs and
133. Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administrationof Strict
Tort Liability for Defective Products,27 S.C.L. REv. 803, 807 n.5 (1976). The language
of the comment clearly indicates that it is applicable only to Alternative A-the beneficiaries named in Comment 3 are those expressly included in this alternative. For the text
of the various alternatives to § 2-318, see note 121 supra. Moreover, Comment 3 appearing after § 2-318 of the U.C.C. specifically refers to the first alternative.
134. See, e.g., Speed Fasteners, Inc. v. Newsom, 382 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1967) (applying Oklahoma law); Omaha Pollution Control Corp. v. Carver-Greenfield, 413 F.
Supp. 1069 (D. Neb. 1976) (applying Nebraska law); Autrey v. Chemtrust Indus. Corp.,
362 F. Supp. 1085 (D. Del 1973) (applying Florida law); Fashion Novelty Corp. v. Cocker
Mach. & Foundry Co., 331 F. Supp. 960 (D.N.J. 1971) (applying New Jersey law). But
see, McHugh v. Carlton, 369 F. Supp. 1271 (D.S.C. 1974) (applying South Carolina law).
135. But cf. Monsanto Co. v. Alden Leeds, Inc., 130 N.J. Super. 245, 326 A.2d 90
(1974). In Monsanto, the Superior Court of New Jersey declined to extend warranty
protection to a corporate landlord. Without mentioning the official comments, the court
determined that § 2-318, Alternative A, established an inclusive class and that it was
"not the duty of the courts to amend the statute where the Legislature has spoken." Id.
at 255, 326 A.2d at 95.
136. In breach of warranty actions, contractual privity once was an essential element
of a plaintiff's cause of action. E.g., Odom v. Ford Motor Co., 230 S.C. 320, 95 S.E.2d 601
(1956); Mauldin v. Milford, 127 S.C. 508, 121 S.E. 547 (1924). Beginning in 1967, however, the court acknowledged the trend away from the privity requirement in products
liability actions based upon breach of warranty. Springfield v. Williams Plumbing Supply Co., 249 S.C. 130, 153 S.E.2d 184 (1967). At the time Springfield was decided, South
Carolina had adopted its version of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE. The provisions did
not become effective until January 1, 1968. Id. at 137, 153 S.E.2d at 187. Since that time,
the absence of contractual privity has not barred an innocent bystander's recovery for
personal injuries against a retailer or a remote vendee's suit for economic loss. McHugh
v. Carlton, 369 F. Supp. 1271 (D.S.C. 1974); Gasque v. Eagle Mach. Co., 270 S.C. 499, 243
S.E.2d 831 (1978). In Gasque, the court did not rely on the common law abrogation of
the privity requirement, but interpreted § 36-2-318's reference to property damage as
including economic loss. Id. at 503, 243 S.E.2d at 832. For a discussion of Gasque, see
Products Liability, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 31 S.C.L. Rnv. 101, 101
(1979).
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corporate plaintiffs on the issue of privity."1 With the JKT
decision, the supreme court intends to "still all whispers of
[privity's] continued existence."13 8
Elizabeth A. Ferrell

137. - S.C. at -, 265 S.E.2d at 512.
138. Id. at -, 265 S.E.2d at 513. Several months after deciding JKT, the supreme
court once again addressed the issue of jrivity in breach of warranty actions. In Terlinde
v. Neely, - S.C. -, 217 S.E.2d 768 (1980), the court held that a builder's "implied warranty for latent defects extends to subsequent home purchasers for a reasonable amount
of time." Id. at -, 271 S.E.2d at 770. This orderly advancement in the common law
abrogation of privity suggests that the same result may be reached in future UCC warranty actions against manufacturers for defective used products. In Terlinde, the class of
purchasers to whom the builder-vendor's implied warranties extended was determined
by the length of time sufficient for latent defects to surface. For more complete discussions of Terlinde, see Contracts, Annual Survey of South CarolinaLaw, 33 S.C.L. REV.
33, 33 (1981); Property,Annual Survey of South CarolinaLaw, 33 S.C.L. Rxv. 125, 137
(1981). Similarly, applying § 36-2-318 language, persons purchasing products during the
time latent defects can be expected to surface are "expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods." S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-318 (1976). Therefore, the seller's warranties
also would be extended to this class of purchasers. The court could reasonably conclude
that a manufacturer-seller's warranties extend for a reasonable time to the purchaser of
a used defective product and that privity of contract is unnecessary to maintain a breach
of warranty action.
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